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Abstract
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) are
stakeholder-driven organizations where changes to
rules or protocols go through a process of stakeholder
approval. Based on interviews with PJM stakeholders,
we observe the perception that the process is held up by
specific coalitions. We use voting data from the PJM
stakeholder process and a model of participatory
decision-making to assess these stakeholder
perceptions, integrated with a model of PJM’s capacity
market to address how stakeholder-driven processes
can design market constructs that promote reliability.
We do observe a strong voting coalition by demand-side
interests (electric distribution utilities and large directaccess customers) but not by supply-side interests. In
theory, this demand-side coalition can act in a pivotal
manner to prevent any rule change from going forward.
In the capacity market redesign case in practice, the
pivotal or swing participants are more likely a smaller
segment of financial market participants, such as hedge
funds and banks.

1. Introduction
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)
control the power grid serving more two-thirds of
electricity customers in the U.S. and are critical
organizations for ensuring reliable system operations
and facilitating the integration of new technologies and
market participants, including renewable power
generation, energy storage and demand response. They
are also supposed to be highly stakeholder-driven
organizations, with rules and policies crafted through a
highly participatory process. While the decisions that
RTOs make have implications for industry, society and
the environment, their decision processes have not been
broadly studied. The environment in which rules and
policies are made is important because market rules
have a critical impact on the value of technology [1].
The preferences of different actors can impact the scale
and scope of technology adoption [2,3], and can even
affect system reliability [4].
The governance of RTOs and the behavior of RTOs
as organizations has been raised a number of times in
the literature (see [5-8] for examples). While questions
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have been raised about the outcomes of such
stakeholder-driven decision processes, those processes
have not, to date, been modeled in any systematic way.
RTOs are tasked with ensuring reliable system
operations, but there has been tension at times between
this performance goal and the design goal for RTOs of
being stakeholder-driven organizations. A recent set of
semi-structured interviews with stakeholders active in
the PJM Interconnection identified a number of sources
of this tension [9,10]:
1. A change in the nature of the decisions that the
stakeholder process in PJM is asked to
consider, from the more general and
foundational to the more specific and
technical;
2. Growth in the number and nature of
stakeholders has made informal coordination
among stakeholders and stakeholder groups
more
difficult
(effectively
increasing
transactions costs for the stakeholder process);
3. A perception among PJM staff that the
increased
difficulty
of
stakeholder
coordination may threaten reliability of the
electricity system – viewed within PJM as the
primary mission of the RTO.
One outgrowth of these stakeholder perceptions has
been to question the extent to which the rules for highly
reliable system operations and planning to support
reliable operations can be well-designed through a
highly participatory process with so many competing
interests. We investigate this question theoretically and
empirically using a highly detailed data set from the
PJM stakeholder process. Our work bridges some of the
seminal literature from political science and political
economy on the theory of voting systems [11 -16] and
integrates models of the stakeholder process and market
rules within PJM. We focus in particular on a series of
votes taken in the PJM stakeholder process in 2011 on
capacity market redesign.
Section 2 of the paper describes the PJM stakeholder
process and the voting structure used in the Members
Committee, the construct on which we primarily focus
in this work. Section 3 describes our voting data set from
PJM and uses network analysis to identify strong
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coalitions among end-user and supplier-side
stakeholders in PJM. Section 4 describes the capacity
market redesign alternatives, while Section 5 develops a
theory of “passable proposals” that we use to
parameterize capacity market designs and the payoffs to
different stakeholders from those designs. In Section 6
we use our passable proposal model to closely examine
the spaces of capacity market redesign proposals that
could or could not pass, and also examine the potential
for different groups of stakeholders to behave pivotally
to keep proposed capacity market redesigns from
passing. Section 7 offers some concluding thoughts and
directions for future research.

2. Voting Structure in the PJM RTO
The stakeholder process in PJM has a complex and
hierarchical structure, as outlined in Figure 1 (the full
structure is available in [17]). Issues and proposed
changes to rules and protocols are often initiated in one
of a large number of thematic or issue-specific
subcommittees. If approved by the subcommittee,
proposed rule changes then move to higher-level
committees, the Markets and Reliability Committee
(MRC) and the Members Committee (MC). Once
passed by the MRC and MC, issues are typically
forwarded to the PJM Board of Managers. Our focus in
this paper is on voting behavior in the MC, for two
reasons. First, detailed voting data is kept at the MC
meetings for issues that do not clearly pass on a voice
vote. Second, the MC has so-called “filing rights” in
some areas of PJM governance, meaning that the MC
can, in concept make filings directly with FERC, thus
bypassing the PJM Board [18].
Thematic)or)Issue/Specific)
Subcommittees) and)Working) Groups
Examples:
• Reliability/Standards/ Subcommittee
• Demand/Response/Subcommittee
• Regional/Planning/ Task/Force

• Markets)and)Reliability)
Committee)(MRC)
• Members)Committee)(MC)
Some/subcommittees/report/first/to/
the/MRC/and/then/the/MC/while/
others/report/to/the/MC/directly.

PJM)Board)of)
Managers

Figure 1: Structure of the PJM Stakeholder
Process. Source: Adapted from [17].
Voting in the MC uses a procedure referred to by
PJM as “sector-weighted voting.” Stakeholder
participants in the MC self-identify with one of five
sectors: Generation Owners (GO), Transmission
Owners (TO), Electric Distribution Utilities (EDU), End
Use Customers (EUC), or Other Suppliers (OS). The
number of MC voters self-identifying in each sector,
along with examples of specific companies in each

sector, is shown in Table 1. Stakeholder participants are
permitted to switch sectors, although we did not observe
this happening very often in our data set. Stakeholders
have some discretion to choose the sector with which
they identify, particularly if they have business units in
multiple sectors (such as a generation owner with a loadserving obligation). The Other Suppliers sector is the
largest and most diverse, consisting primarily of
curtailment service providers, financial institutions,
marketers and traders, and municipal/co-op utilities.
Table 1: Composition of MC Voters. Source:
PJM [19]
Number of
Firms (%)

Sector
End Use
Customers

6 (4%)

Electric
Distributors

14 (9%)

Generation
Owners
Transmission
Owners
Other Suppliers

Example Firms
Air Products, Proctor &
Gamble
PEPCO, Northern
Virginia Electric
Cooperative

22 (15%)

Calpine, NRG

5 (3%)

Duquesne Light, PSEG

105 (69%)

Direct Energy (CSP),
Citigroup Energy
(Financial), EDF Trading
(Marketer)

Each of the five sectors is given equal weight in the
PJM sector-weighted voting scheme. Within a given
sector, each voting member is given equal weight. For
each issue, MC participants can choose to vote yes or
no, or can choose to abstain. A final voting score V is
calculated as:
(1) 𝑉 =

.

(&% '(% ) #$%
+,&% '(%

,

where djk is an indicator variable equal to one if voter
j from sector k voted yes and zero if voter j from sector
k voted no, nk is the total number of firms in sector k,
and ak is the number of abstaining firms in sector k. A
voting item passes if it attains a voting score of V³
3.335. This is equivalent to needing a supermajority of
the five sectors for a vote to pass, and means that two
sectors voting together (irrespective of the number of
voters in the two sectors) could effectively act as a
pivotal coalition, keeping any voting item from passing.
Because of variation in the number of MC
participants in each of the five sectors, an individual
firm’s vote may contribute more in one sector than in
other sectors. This phenomenon, and the MC voting
system overall, is illustrated by the hypothetical voting
item in Table 2.
Table 2: Sector-Weighted Voting Example
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Sector'weighted-voting-example
Sector
Transmission1Owner
Generation1Owner
Other1Supplier
Electric1Distributor
End1Use1Customer

For
8
15
10
3
12

Against Abstain
2
4
0
1
10
5
7
15
2
0

Total
14
16
25
25
14

Total12 Abstain
%1in1favor
10
0.8
15
1
20
0.5
10
0.3
14
0.857
Total1%1in1favor
3.457
Threshold1=13.335
(2/31of1total1vote,1.6671x151sectors)

In this example (which is not based on any actual
data and is only for illustration), there are 94 MC voters,
25 of which abstain. There are thus 10 counted voters
from the TO sector, 15 voters from the GO sector, 20
voters from the OS sector, 10 voters from the ED sector
and 14 voters from the EUC sector. Of the counted
voters, 80% from the TO sector voted in favor (8 out of
10 voters that did not abstain), yielding a voting score
from that sector of 0.8. As another example, 100% of
the voters in the GO sector voted in favor, yielding a
voting score of 1 for that sector. When the voting scores
for all five sectors are added up, the overall voting score
for this hypothetical issue is V = 3.347. Since this is
higher than the threshold score of V = 3.335, this
hypothetical voting issue would have passed.

our network representation. Branches were weighted by
the frequency with which firms voted together across
our 26 voting items.
A visualization of the voting network for firms
voting against specific voting items is shown in Figure
2 (i.e., Figure 2 shows the frequency with which firms
vote together in opposition to certain issues – the
frequency with which they vote together in favor of
certain issues or abstain would essentially be the inverse
of the network shown in Figure 2). The figure also
shows the results of a community identification
algorithm [20,21] that we used to identify strong
coalitions in our voting network. The community
detection algorithm essentially performs hierarchical
clustering on the network and identifies sub-groups of
voters that vote together more frequently than with other
sub-groups.

3. The Structure of Stakeholder Voting
in PJM
Detailed voting data from the PJM MC was obtained
from the PJM web site covering the period 2011 to 2015
[19]. Data prior to 2011 was not available for PJM.
Voting data for the MRC and other subcommittees is not
recorded in the same level of detail as voting data from
the MC. Our data set consists of firm-level voting data
for 26 votes cast on a wide variety of topics. We note
that the MC votes on a large number of issues each year,
and most pass or fail by voice vote. The 26 voting items
in our data set thus represent a subset of votes taken
during the time period 2011 – 2015 when an official
vote count was requested by PJM or by a member of the
MC. For each voting item, the data we obtained from
PJM lists the name of the voting firm, how the firm
voted (or if it abstained), their sectoral affiliation and
primary line(s) of business (which, as discussed in Sec.
2, may be different than their sectoral affiliation), some
information on the size of their generation holdings,
transmission holdings and load obligations in PJM (i.e.,
whether each firm identifies as a small or large generator
and identifies as a net buyer or seller), and the name of
the person representing that firm on each vote.
To visualize the extent of and strength of coalitions
across all 26 of the voting items, we structured the
voting data as a weighted network. Each firm in the
network was represented as a node, with branches
representing votes. Two firms voting together on an
individual voting item were thus linked by a branch in

Figure 2: The Voting Network of the PJM MC.
Our clustering algorithm identified three
communities in the PJM voting network, represented as
green, red and yellow nodes and branches in Figure 2.
As would be expected, the densities of these detected
communities are individually quite high (between 0.95
and 0.99). More interesting is the composition of the
detected communities. One of the communities shown
in the network in Figure 2 consists primarily of firms
from the ED and EUC sectors. The other two
communities are split between the remaining three
sectors (GO, TO and OS).
Recall from Section 1 that our semi-structured
interviews revealed a perception among some
participants in the PJM stakeholder process that loadside sectors (ED and EUC) form a strong coalition
against the passage of some initiatives. The interviews
also revealed a perception among some stakeholders
that supply-side sectors (primarily GO and TO) form a
strong coalition that keeps initiatives from passing. Our
network analysis of the 26 voting items overall suggests
that there is some evidence for a strong ED-EUC
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coalition that could stop initiatives from passing either
through natural alignment or through explicit
coordination. We find much less evidence from the
voting network of such a strong coalition among any of
the other three sectors. Strong coalitions of some voters
across these three sectors to exist, as shown in Figure 2,
but because they effectively divide sectors they cannot
act in the same pivotal way as the ED-EUC coalition.

4. Capacity Market Redesign in PJM
The remainder of our analysis of the PJM
stakeholder process is focused on a series of six MC
votes taken on the same day in 2011. Each of these six
voting items represented a proposed change to the
structure of PJM’s forward capacity construct, known as
the Reliability Pricing Model. The proposed RPM
changes followed the release of the second triennial
RPM review by the Brattle Group [22]. All six proposals
concerned the shape of the Variable Resource
Requirements (VRR) curve, the administrative demand
curve that PJM uses to determine the clearing point for
the capacity market. None of the six proposals passed
the MC with the required threshold voting score of
3.335 or higher, as shown in Table 3 (the details of each
proposal are described in Sec. 4.1, below). The failure
of the MC to pass any of the proposed RPM redesigns
(including a status-quo proposal under which no
changes would have been made to the VRR curve)
triggered an alternative resolution process called the
Enhanced Liason Committee process, under which
groups of self-organized stakeholders presented RPM
redesign alternatives to the PJM Board.
Table 3: Outcomes of RPM Redesign Votes
Item Date

Voting,item

TO

GO

EUC

ED

Other

04b0 10/20/2011

Status,Quo

0.083

0.071

0.083

0.043

0.056

0.336

Voting,Score
Failed

04b1 10/20/2011

PJM,Recommendation

0.8

0.833

0

0

0.667

2.3

Failed

04b2 10/20/2011

Package,10

0.75

0.714

0

0

0.323

1.787

Failed

04b3 10/20/2011

Package,11

0.167

0.08

0.909

0.913

0.235

2.301

Failed

04b4 10/20/2011

Package,12

0.167

0.231

1

0.913

0.25

2.561

Failed

04b5 10/20/2011

Package,13

0.333

0.267

1

1

0.513

3.113

Failed

As can be seen from Table 3, some proposed RPM
redesigns had fairly broad support among the ED and
EUC sectors (such as Packages 11, 12 and 13), while
others had strong opposition from the ED and EUC
sectors (such as Package 10 and the PJM proposed RPM
change). The status quo RPM proposal had the lowest
overall voting score among any of the six RPM voting
items.
The failure of the MC to pass any proposed redesign
to RPM represented the first time that the stakeholder
process had deadlocked in this way, and in our
interviews raised concerns among both stakeholder
participants and PJM staff as to the extent to which

issues like RPM and resource adequacy more broadly
could be handled by the current stakeholder voting
structure. We take advantage of the unique number and
structure of these votes, combined with our detailed
voting data and a model of participatory decisionmaking to address two key questions relevant to using
the stakeholder process to ensure reliability. First, we
parameterize payoff functions for different types of
firms in the PJM stakeholder process to generate a
predictive voting model for this series of RPM votes and
try to identify any change to the VRR curve that would
have passed through the MC voting process. Second, we
identify that while in theory the ED-EUC coalition
described in Sec. 3 could (and sometimes does) behave
pivotally to keep voting items from passing, in the
specific case of RPM redesign the pivotal voters were
more likely to be a smaller number of financial players.

4.1. Modeling the VRR Redesign Proposals
The six RPM votes on which we focus our analysis
all concern the shape of the VRR curve, as shown in
Figure 3. The the VRR curve parameters most salient to
our analysis include the Gross Cost of New Entry
(CONE); the CONE net of estimated energy and
ancillary services payments (referred to as “Net
CONE”); and the Installed Reserve Margin (IRM),
which refers to the quantity of capacity needed to meet
peak demand plus the calculated capacity reserve.
Under the RPM specifications at the time that the votes
were taken, the VRR curve is horizontal at a level just
below Gross CONE until the cleared capacity is a
certain level below the IRM (point a in Figure 3). The
Gross CONE thus serves as the price cap in the RPM.
Between point a and a level of cleared capacity just
above the IRM, the VRR curve slopes downward until
it intersects with the Net CONE (point b in Figure 3). At
higher levels of cleared capacity the VRR curve
continues to slope downward until the cleared capacity
reaches several percentage points above IRM (point c in
Figure 3). Beyond point c, the VRR curve is vertical,
indicating zero value to additional cleared capacity.
While the determination of the Gross and Net CONE
is a complex matter involving the estimation of
technology costs and market outcomes, the RPM
redesign proposals considered by the MC in our data set
ultimately amount to proposals over the level of points
a and b on the VRR curve. No proposal considered by
the MC at the time in question would have affected point
c. Parameterizing the VRR curve proposals considered
by the MC is relatively straightforward.
Figure 4 shows the six RPM proposals visually. As
outlined in Table 3, one proposal represented the status
quo (no change to the VRR curve); another came as a
recommendation from PJM staff (referred to in the
voting data as “package 1”); and four others were
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proposed by various PJM stakeholders. Compared to the
status quo and other things being held equal, packages
11, 12, and 13 estimate future demand to be smaller than
previous predictions leading the capacity price to be
settled at lower level as compared to the status quo (dark
blue line in Figure 4). On the other hand, packages 1 and
10, would have set point 𝑎 vertically above point 𝑏,
induce the clearing price to be at the price cap even
when the supply offer is a little less than the target
margin. This is about 40 percent or more than 60 percent
increase in the price for package 10 and 1 respectively.

5. A Model of Passable Proposals
As discussed in Sec. 3, all six of the proposed RPM
redesigns failed to pass through the stakeholder process,
including the status quo VRR curve. To assess the
existence of any proposed capacity market redesign that
would have achieved the voting score threshold for
passage through the MC, we adapt the “acceptable
proposal” model from the political economy literature
[15,16] to the structure and participant composition of
the PJM Members Committee. While the acceptable
proposal framework models consensus decisions, it is
easily adaptable to the type of super-majority voting
framework of the MC. To avoid confusion with
consensus decision-making we thus refer to our
framework as one to assess the existence of “passable
proposals.”
Suppose there are n relevant policy parameters X =
(x1,…,xn) (here X represents the status quo); m
individuals and their utility functions 𝑈 3 =
𝑈 3 (𝑥- , ⋯ , 𝑥& ) where 𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑚; a proposal 𝒚 =
𝑑𝑥- , ⋯ , 𝑑𝑥& . If a proposal is acceptable for
individual i, then it needs to satisfy:

Ui * Ui *
dx1 +
dx2 +
x1
x2

Figure 3: Example VRR Curve. Source: Author
calculations based on [22]

+

Ui *
dxn > 0
xn

(1)
Equation (1) represents increase in utility of
individual 𝑖 with the implementation of the proposal y*
= (dx1*,…,dxn*). We assume that the payoff function of
the i-th voter is proportional to her utility function, with
li the constant of proportionality. Consensus in this
framework is defined as the payoff function condition
Ay > 0, where

1

(2)

The set of proposed changes to the RPM considered
by the MC thus consist of three proposals that would
have lowered capacity prices relative to the status quo;
two that would have raised capacity prices relative to the
status quo; and the status quo VRR curve at the time that
the proposals were voted upon.

1

U1
xn

A=
n

Figure 3: VRR Curves Considered by the MC.
Source: Author calculations based on [22]

U1
x1
Um
x1

n

Um
xn

y1
,

y=

y2

i

>0

yn

Recall that a passable proposal in the PJM MC is one
that can achieve an overall voting score of 3.335 or
higher. We adapt the framework in equations (1) and (2)
by defining 𝒁 as a set of firm𝑠 that satisfies equation (2)
and would thus vote yes on the proposal.Then a
complement of 𝒁, 𝒁𝒄 , is a set of firms that will vote no.
Passage of a voting item in the PJM stakeholder
framework needs 3∈𝒁 𝑤3 > 3.335 where 𝑤3 is the
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sector-weight of a firm 𝑖. In other words, blockage of an
issue requires 3∈𝒁𝒄 𝑤3 > 1.665.
If firm-level utility functions can be sufficiently
parameterized, we can use the framework in equations
(1) and (2) to develop a predictive model of stakeholder
voting, and can apply this model to the series of RPM
votes faced by the PJM Members Committee in 2011.

5.1. Parameterizing Payoff Functions
We use our parameterization of the capacity market
proposals as specifying the shape of the VRR curve
(points a and b in Figures 3 and 4), combined with some
information on the composition of participants in the
PJM Members Committee, to parameterize utility
functions for different types of firms.

end use customer (EUC) and other supplier (OS). We
assume that all players within a single type are
homogenous, although we will start to relax this
assumption later in the paper and can relax it even
further in future work. We assume that GO payoffs are
directly proportional to capacity prices, while payoffs
for ED and EUC are inversely proportional. Capacity
payments are assumed to be made directly from ED
firms and indirectly from EUC firms, so we set a share
of the total capacity payment burden for ED firms as q
and the payment burden equal to (1- q), q is between 0
and 1.
The form of the payoff function for GO, ED and
EUC firms will depend on whether the proposal point y
being considered lies to the left or right of point b on the
VRR curve, as shown in Figure 5. We illustrate these
payoff functions assuming that the clearing quantity is
below the IRM by a percent. In this case, the payoff
functions for the GO, ED and EUC type players can be
written as:
(3)

𝑎−𝑏
×𝑄T
4
(𝑎 − 𝑏)
𝑃WXYTXY , 𝑄 = 𝑃WXYTXY ×𝑄L − 𝜃 𝑏 + 𝛼×
×𝑄T
4

𝜋IJ 𝑃L , 𝑄, 𝐶 = 𝑃L − 𝐶 ×𝑄L + 𝑏 + 𝛼×
𝜋UV

𝜋U[\ 𝑃TXY , 𝑄 = −𝑃TXY ×𝑄L − (1
(𝑎 − 𝑏)
− 𝜃) 𝑏 + 𝛼×
×𝑄T
4

Figure 5: RPM Price Sensitivity to a Deviation
of a% From the IRM Target.
For the purposes of this discussion, we assume that
there are five types of players in the PJM Members
Committee, corresponding to the five sectoral
definitions in the PJM stakeholder process (see also Sec.
2). This assumption will be relaxed somewhat below
and is the topic of ongoing research. We also assume
that firm-level utility can be represented by a payoff
function dependent only on capacity market outcomes.
In other words, we assume that payoffs from the
capacity market are separable from payoffs in (for
example) the energy and ancillary services markets, and
firms thus vote for or against capacity market redesign
proposals based solely on how each proposal would
affect capacity market outcomes and not outcomes in
other PJM markets. This may well be a strong
assumption and is an area for future model refinement.
We assume that there are five types of players in the
PJM stakeholder process, corresponding to the five
stakeholder sectors: generation owner (GO),
transmission owner (TO), electric distributor (ED) and

where PW is the clearing price in the wholesale market,
C is the marginal cost of generation, PNetRet is the retail
rate net of transmission charges and wholesale costs, PR
is the gross retail rate, Q is the wholesale clearing
quantity, QW is the cleared quantity in the wholesale
market, QR is the cleared quantity in the capacity market
and q is the ED’s share of capacity costs as described
above.
Modeling the payoff function for the TO sector is
somewhat more complex, since a firm owning no assets
other than transmission would neither benefit nor be
harmed by higher or lower capacity prices. We note
from our data, however, that all but one of the firms in
the TO sector are investor owned utilities with
generation assets and load serving obligations; many
voted for those capacity market proposals that would
have tended to increase the capacity price. We
parameterize the payoff function for the TO sector as
being composed of a weighted sum of payoffs from the
generation, transmission and load serving business
functions:

3080

(4)

𝜋 ]J 𝑃^ , 𝑃] , 𝑃WXYTXY 𝐶, 𝑄L , 𝑄T = 𝛾-

𝑄 + (𝑏 + 𝛼×

('`
a

)×𝑄T + 𝛾b 𝑃] ×𝑄 + 𝛾c

𝑄 − 𝜃×(𝑏 + 𝛼×

('`
a

𝑃^ − 𝐶 ×
𝑃WXYTXY ×

)×𝑄T

In equation (4), 𝛾3 is a share of asset 𝑖, where 0 <
𝛾3 < 1, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3 (generation, transmission, load
server respectively) and 𝛾- + 𝛾b + 𝛾c = 1. PT
represents the transmission fee.
From (4), we calculate marginal payoffs for this
sector as:
(5)

𝜕𝜋 𝛼
= 𝑄 𝛾 − 𝜃𝛾c
𝜕𝑎 4 T 𝜕𝜋
𝛼
= 1−
𝑄 (𝛾 − 𝜃𝛾c )
𝜕𝑏
4 T -

From (5), note in particular that payoffs for the TO
sector do not depend on the share of its business in the
transmission sector (g2). Whether payoffs increase or
decrease with marginally higher values of a and b in (5)
depends on the quantity γ- − 𝜃γc . Our model thus
predicts that firms in the TO sector with large quantities
of generation would vote in favor of proposals that
would tend to increase capacity prices.
Parameterizing the payoff functions for the OS
sector is also difficult, since that sector is highly
heterogeneous, consisting of curtailment service
providers, marketers, municipal and cooperative
utilities, other transmission-dependent utilities, and
purely financial players (such as banks and hedge funds
that participate in PJM primarily via virtual bidding).
We observe in our data that curtailment service
providers vote with generation owners in support of
capacity market proposals that would, other things being
equal, lead to higher capacity clearing prices.
Municipal, cooperative, and transmission-dependent
utilities with generation holdings also tended to vote in
alignment with the GO sector. Marketers and financial
players are the most difficult to model, so we will treat
these participants as “undecided” or swing voters in our
model.

6. The Geometry of Capacity Market
Voting
We are now in a position to integrate the theory of
passable proposals in the PJM stakeholder process
(equations 1 and 2) with our parameterization of the
proposed changes to the RPM and the payoff functions
of different voter types (equations 3 through 5) to
identify conditions under which a proposal for reform to

the VRR curve would be passable. As we will see, the
existence of a passable proposal depends on both the
proposal characteristics (points a and b) and the voting
patterns of the OS sector.
Let M be a matrix consisting of rows of Ay
satisfying:
𝑚3,` 𝑑𝑎 > 0
𝑑𝑏

(6) 𝑴𝒚 = 𝑚3,(

where mi,a and mi,b represent the marginal payoff to
player i from a change in a and b, respectively. Inserting
equations (3) – (5) into equations (1) and (2), the
conditions for acceptability are given by:
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Note that in the system of equations (7), we have
o[ qr

o[ qr

purposefully left the derivatives
and
o(
o`
ambiguous for players in the OS sector whose incentives
are difficult to identify based on player characteristics
or voting records.
The size of the matrix 𝑴 (i.e,. the number of TO
players who would find a given RPM design proposal
acceptable). depends on the sign of 𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c . This is
because TO profits differ according to the the
importance of the generation versus load serving side of
the business, as shown in equation (4).
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Consider the acceptability criterion for TO when the
capacity market clears at a level lower than the target
IRM:

(9)
𝑚IJ,(
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𝑚\lm,(
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If 𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c > 0, then we have:
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𝛼
𝛼
𝑄T ×𝑑𝑎 + 1 − 𝑄T ×𝑑𝑏 > 0
4
4
𝛼
⇒ 𝑑𝑏 > −
×𝑑𝑎
4−𝛼
and the TO firm would be predicted to vote in alignment
with the GO sector. If 𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c < 0 we would then
n
have 𝑑𝑏 < −
×𝑑𝑎 and the TO firm would be
a'n
predicted to vote in alignment with the ED and EUC
sector.
Assuming that CSPs have payoff functions
equivalent to those of the GO sector, we can draw the
payoff functions in the space of modifications to the
capacity market as shown in Figure 6. Since the payoffs
are non-overlapping, whether a given proposal passes or
not would depend on the number of undecided
stakeholders that could be convinced to vote for or
against it.

Figure 7: Representation of proposals in
stakeholder preference space.
Whether such a proposal would pass can be
evaluated by looking at the sector-weighted voting share
contributed by those stakeholders that would vote for it,
those that would vote against, and those that are
undecided and act as swing voters.

6.1. Application from the RPM Voting Data
Set

Figure 6: The space of possible modifications
to the capacity market.
By way of illustration, suppose that a proposal is
represented by one of the arrows in Figure 7. It would
thus be acceptable to the GO sector, CSPs and those TOs
for which 𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c > 0. We would then have:

The geometry of voting in the case of the RPM
redesign proposals and the influence of “undecided”
voters can be illustrated with two examples, taken from
a proposal that would have increased the capacity
clearing price, other things being equal, relative to the
status quo. We will evaluate this proposal using the
coalition model developed in this paper to predict how
firms would vote, and then using the actual voting data.
In the language of Section 5, Figure 7 suggests that
we
would
have
𝒁 = 𝐺𝑂, 𝑇𝑂- , 𝐶𝑆𝑃 , 𝒁𝒄 =
b
𝒄
𝐸𝐷, 𝐸𝑈𝐶, 𝑇𝑂 , 𝐔 = 𝑂𝑆 (where OS excludes the
CSPs and other firms with alignment with other sectors).
Using the mechanism of sector-weighted voting
employed in PJM, if voters in coalition Z vote in favor,
the voters in coalition Zc vote in opposition, we would
have
3∈𝒁 𝑤3 = 1.95,
3∈𝒁𝒄 𝑤3 = 2.25, and 𝑤Jl =
0.8. Thus, under PJM rules, our model predicts that
either coalition Z or Zc could have blocked the proposal
from passing. Since Zc consists primarily of the ED and
EUC sector, this illustration suggests that a demand-side
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coalition could theoretically block any capacity market
redesign proposal that would tend to increase the
capacity clearing price.
In practice, however, we observe some deviations
from our voting model. Some firms in the GO sector, for
example, voted against capacity market proposals that
would have tended to raise capacity clearing prices
relative to the status quo. Some firms in the ED and EUC
sectors voted for such proposals. Based on observed
voting behavior, we have 3∈𝒁 𝑤3 = 1.658, 3∈𝒁𝒄 𝑤3 =
2.52, and 𝑤Jl = 0.822.
The role of the undecided or swing voters from the
OS sector is more clear in practice than in theory. Under
PJM sector-weighted voting rules, coalition Zc needed
only two votes from the undecided OS sector in order to
ensure failure of the capacity market proposal (recall
that a coalition can prevent a proposal from passing with
a total voting score of 1.655 or greater). Recall that the
undecided OS sector consists primarily of firms that do
not take physical positions in the market (such as
marketers, banks and hedge funds) and as such do not
have any apparent stake in capacity market outcomes. It
is not immediately clear why these firms in the OS
sector are voting for or against the various capacity
market redesign proposals. These firms may have other
business units that do have a stake in physical market
outcomes (for example, banks may be involved in
project finance) or they may be engaged in coalitionbuilding that spans votes on multiple issue types [23].

7. Conclusions and Future Work
Regional Transmission Organizations are critical
organizations for ensuring reliability and facilitating the
integration of new technology in the U.S. electric power
grid. The rules and protocols that influence the value of
new technology and the cost of achieving reliable
operations are not created in a vacuum, but are rather the
result of a stakeholder-driven process that we argue can
be modeled in a systematic way. We have illustrated two
potential ways in which formal models of the
stakeholder process could be utilized – to verify
stakeholder perceptions of power in the stakeholder
process, and to address the increasingly relevant
question of whether electricity market rules can be
successfully designed directly by the players in those
markets. We draw three conclusions from this work.
First, we do find evidence in a broad set of voting
data that end-use interests (the ED and EUC sectors) do
form a strong coalition that can and does act to strike
down proposals before the MC. This is consistent with
the perceptions viewed by some stakeholders in our
semi-structured interviews. We do not find evidence of
a similarly strong coalition among supplier-side
interests.

Second, our application of the passable-proposal
model to the capacity market shows how in theory either
a coalition of end-use sectors and some transmission
owners, or a coalition of supply-side participants and
other transmission owners could keep any capacity
market redesign proposal from passing. This theoretical
finding suggests that there may be limits to the degree
to which organizations like RTOs can create
mechanisms for heterogeneous stakeholders with
opposing interests to develop passable market rules and
protocols.
Third, the reality of voting in the capacity market
redesign case suggests that the formation of such
“pivotal coalitions” is more complex than our model of
passable proposals would suggest. While in theory
clean-cut coalitions of end-use or supply-side interest
could act to keep capacity market redesign proposals
from passing, in practice the formation of these
coalitions depends on convincing a small number of
swing players to vote in alignment with the coalition.
These swing players, primarily marketers and financial
firms, represent the pivotal voters in the capacity market
redesign case. Identifying the types of pivotal voters or
coalitions for other voting issues is a topic of ongoing
research.
Our analysis suggests that market-driven constructs
to ensure resource adequacy may not be amenable to
design by the type of stakeholder-driven processes
currently in place in PJM. Given the controversy over
capacity market constructs and the financial stakes, this
is perhaps not surprising.
The history of difficulty in making changes to the
RPM design was the justification for the use of an
alternative mechanism for the construction of PJM’s
recent capacity performance rules [24]. Under this
alternative mechanism, known as the Enhanced Liason
Committee (ELC), stakeholders participate in the policy
formation process but not through voting. Coalitions of
stakeholders are self-organized, rather than stakeholders
being associated with one of the five industry sectors
described in this paper (a choice which, as discussed,
affects the voting power of each stakeholder). In the
capacity performance mechanism design process, nearly
a dozen coalitions emerged from the PJM stakeholder
group. Each coalition produced a position paper, and the
PJM Board ultimately made the decision on which
proposal to support and file with the FERC.
From an organizational theory standpoint, the ELC
process actually has some advantages to the more
structured stakeholder voting procedure. Because of its
mission to make decisions in a stakeholder-driven way,
RTOs share many commonalities with “boundary
organizations,” described in the organizational theory
literature [25] as those who need to reconcile diverse
and conflicting interests. The ELC represents a step
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towards PJM acting as this type of organization by
disrupting the type of power balance observed in our
analysis and allowing coalitions to emerge rather than
be defined by sectoral affiliation. While the outcome is
not guaranteed to be one that is universally accepted,
PJM should consider expanding its use by identifying
issue types where the traditional stakeholder process is
likely to deadlock and invoking the ELC (or something
like it) in its place.
As a mechanism for identifying these types of
controversial issues, the approach used in this paper has
some potential but additional work is needed to identify
drivers behind deviations from coalition voting, which
we observed in our capacity market analysis. Additional
future work involves comparisons between PJM and
other Regional Transmission Organizations. Since we
find some evidence suggestive of dynamic interplay
between stakeholders, particularly between traditional
players in the physical market and what appear to be
purely or primarily financial players, another area of
future work involves using a more dynamic or gametheoretic framework to model the repeated interactions
of participants in the PJM stakeholder process.
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